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RECENT CASE NOTES
proof of improper means either contemplated or used.6 These recent cases
argue that if no improper means were contemplated or used, then there should
be no policy against such contracts. 7
In early Indiana decisions contingent fees for appearance before the
judiciary were prohibited.S Gradually these contracts were recognized as
not leading to any immoral or improper consequences. The temptation to
employ improper means before the judiciary is as great as before the legis-
lature. The same reasons advanced for allowing contingent fees before the
judiciary can be used in arguing for this method of compensation for appear-
ance before the legislature. Many deserving causes will be neglected because
of lack of resources with which to present them unless this method of com-
pensation is allowed. This reasoning applies particularly where the person
desiring legislation has a just claim against the state.9
The Indiana legislature in 1915 prohibited the employment of any person
as legislative counsel on a contingent fee basis.lO Even before this act the
Indiana Supreme Court had declared that contingent fee contracts for influenc-
ing legislation could not be enforced because of the tendency of such contracts
toward the use of improper means.1 1
It would seem that although the principal case is probably correctly de-
cided on the basis of past decisions of the courts, there is strong argument in
favor of allowing recovery in such cases. The case would probably be followed
in Indiana in view of the Statute above mentioned. G. H. E.
CONTRACrs-TEACHERS' TENuRE.-Plaintiff brought suit for the breach of a
permanent teacher's tenure contract, the alleged breach consisting of de-
fendant's refusal to assign him a teaching position since 1931. Damages
sought were loss of salary from date of breach. Held, for defendant; a
permanent tenure teacher's indefinite contract is a protected contractual right
entitling the teacher to a succession of definite contracts, but such indefinite
contract will not sustain an action for compensatory damages. Lost Creek
School Tp., Figo County v. York (Ind. 1939), 21 N. E. (2nd) 58.
The case presents two questions: first, what is the nature of the indefinite
contract for which the statute provides, and second, what are the remedial
rights thereunder? As to the first question, there is sound basis for the
holding that the indefinite contract gives the teacher a mere functional rela-
tionship, a right to be re-employed, and does not provide the specific terms
for the employment in any school year. The tenure act provides that it shall
be construed as supplementary to the Act of 1921 which sets out the require-
ments to be incorporated in teachers' yearly contracts and prohibits the bring-
0Kemble v. Weaver (1925), 200 Iowa 1333, 206 N. V. 83; Stansell v.
Roach (1923), 147 Tenn. 183, 246 S. W. 520; West v. Coos County (1925), 115
Ore. 409, 237 P. 961.
7 Coyne v. Superior Incinerator Co. of Texas (1936), 80 F. (2d) 844;
Herrick v. Barzee (1920), 96 Ore. 357, 190 P. 141; West v. Coos County
(1925), 115 Ore. 409, 237 P. 961.
S Lafferty v. Jelley (1864), 22 Ind. 471; Scobey v. Ross (1859), 13 Ind. 117.
9 Stroemer v. Van Orsdel (1905), 74 Neb. 132, 103 N. V. 1053.
10 Acts of 1915, Ch. 2, § 4, par. 5; Burns Ind. Stat. Ann. 1933, § 34-304.
11 Coquillard's Administrators v. Bearss (1863), 21 Ind. 479.
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ing of an action on any contract not in conformity therewith.1 A supple-
mentary act adds to the former and takes nothing from it.2 Thus the require-
ment that there be definite yearly contracts was left the same by the tenure
act, and any action brought on a yearly contract of employment which does
not meet the requirements of the Act of 1921 could not be sustained. But the
tenure act provides for an additional relation between schools and teachers,
separate and apart from the relation arising out of definite yearly contracts,
and it is the rights arising out of this additional relationship which are
in question.
Although the court in the principal case denied damages in an action at
law, it does not necessarily follow that the teacher is finally precluded from
a recovery of damages. 3 He can ask for general relief in equity, and the
court, in addition to compelling the school district to give the teacher a
definite contract to run in the future, can, considering that as done which
should have been done, do complete justice and award damages for the time
during which the teacher was not allowed to teach.4 But there is no sufficient
reason why damages should not be recoverable at law as well. The Indiana
courts have awarded damages for the breach of the permanent tenure contract
in a number of cases decided previously to the principal case, and even based
the quantum of damages upon the salary received by the teacher during the
last year that he served under a definite contract.5
The United States Supreme Court has held that the relationship which
arises between a teacher and a school district under the Teachers' Tenure Act
is contractual, and not merely one of status. 6 This being true it appears that
either party should be entitled to damages for a breach by the other. From
the wrong of breach of contract, injury is presumed, and the right to recover
damages is thereby established. 7 The party injured must, of course, sustain
1 Ind. Acts 1921, c. 91, § 1; Burns Ind. Stat. Ann. (1933), § 284304; Acts
1927, c. 97, §§ 1, 6; 1933, c. 116, §§ 1, 5; Burns Ind. Stat. Ann. (1933),§§ 28-4307, 28-4312.
2 Board of School Comm. v. State ex rel. Wolfolk (1936), 209 Ind. 498, 199
N. E. 569; McCleary v. Babcock (1907), 169 Ind. 228, 82 N. E. 453; State
ex rel. Cuneo v. Board of Commissioners of Wyandott Co. (1897), 16 Ohio
C. C. 218.
a The Indiana Statute of limitations provides that a party who seeks to
enforce a right but pursues the wrong remedy may bring a new action within
five years after the determination of the first, and it shall be deemed a con-
tinuation of the first. Ind. Acts 1881 (Spec. Sess.), c. 38, §45; Burns Ind.
Stat. Ann. (1933), §2-608. Cases cited.
4Doherty v Holliday (1893), 137 Ind. 282, 32 N. E. 315; Spidell v. John-
son (1890), 128 Ind. 235, 25 N. E. 889, 19 Am. Jur. 125-132.
5 Haddon School Twp. of Sullivan County v. Willis (1935), 209 Ind. 356,
199 N. E. 251; Ratcliff v. Dick Johnson School Twp. (1935), 204 Ind. 525,
185 N. E. 143; School City of Brazil v. Rupp (1937), 104 Ind. App. 287, 10
N. E. (2nd) 924; Patoka School Twp v. Ashby (1938), 105 Ind. App. 235, 14
N. E. (2d) 764; Spice Valley School Twp. of Lawrence Co. v. Rizer (1938),
214 Ind. App. 528, 15 N. E. (2d) 270; Sherrod v. Lawrenceburg School City
(1938), 213 Ind. 392, 12 N. E. (2d) 944.6 State ex rel. Anderson v. Brand (1938), 303 U. S. 95, 58 S. Ct. 95.
7 Restatement, Contracts (1932), § 327. 5 Williston, Contracts (Rev. ed.
1937), § 1338; Finley v. Atlantic Transport Co. (1917), 220 N. Y. 249, 115
N. E. 715, L. R. A. 1917E 852, Ann. Cas. 1917D 726; Hall v. Delphi-Deer
Creek Twp School Corp. (1933), 98 Ind. App. 409, 189 N. E 527, 15 Am.
Jur. 3934.
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the burden of proving actual damage, and the defendant can offer evidence
to mitigate the damages. However, if, in any case, the plaintiff cannot prove
actual damage, he is nevertheless entitled, on proof of the breach alone, to an
award of nominal damages.8
The court, in the principal case, refuses to allow damages because the
indefinite contract sued upon does not supply certain terms under which the
service is to be rendered, so as to provide a definite criterion for ascertaining
the quantum of damages. In the great number of cases in which recovery has
been denied on the grounds of uncertainty, it is to be observed that the real
reason for the decisions is that there has been no agreement and so no contract
on which to recover.9 In the principal case it has been established that there
is a contract-an agreement.' 9  So long as there is damage, and damage is
presumed from the breach of a contract, uncertainty as to the amount is not
a bar to recovery."1 Moreover, it has been held that a wrongdoer who has,
by his wrong, caused the uncertainty as to the amount of damage may not
complain of such uncertainty and obviate liability on those grounds. 1 2
Courts have awarded damages for the breach of a contract to make a
contract, as the court holds the teacher's indefinite contract to be.13 These
contracts have been specifically enforced1 4 even though the courts have re-
peatedly held that a higher degree of certainty in the agreement is required
for a decree of specific performance than for a judgment for damages.' 5
Moreover, the courts have upheld contracts for permanent employment, even
where the terms under which the service is to be rendered may not have been
definitely fixed. Especially is this true where, in return for the promise that
the employment be permanent, there can be found some consideration other
than the mere promise to perform services. Damages have been awarded
for the breach of these contracts, applying the test of reasonableness to ascer-
8 5 Williston, Contracts (Rev. Ed. 1937), § 1339A; Hall v. Delphi-Deer Creek
Twp. School Corp. (1933), 98 Ind. App. 409, 189 N. E. 527; Rosenbaum v.
McThomas (1870), 34 Ind. 331; Ladoga Canning Co. v. Corydon Canning Co
(1912), 52 Ind. App. 23; 98 N. E. 849; Grau v. Grau (1905), 37 Ind. App. 635,
77 N. E. 8161 Watts v. Weston (1894), 62 Fed. 136.
9 5 Williston, Contracts (Rev. Ed. 1937), § 1339; Crichfield v. Julia (1906),
203 U. S. 593, 27 S. Ct. 781, 147 Fed. 65; Occidental Consolidated Mining Co.
v. Comstock Tunnel Co. (1903), 125 Fed. 244.
10 State ex rel Anderson v. Brand (1938), 303 U. S. 95, 58 S. Ct. 95.
11 Story Parchment Co. v. Paterson Co. (1930), 282 U. S. 555, 75 h. Ed.
544, 51 S. Ct. 248; Shannon v. Shaffer Oil and Refining Co. (1931), 51 F. (2d)
878, 78 A. L. R. 851; Hoffer Oil Corporation v. Carpenter (1929), 34 F. (2d)
589, 15 Am. Jur. 414.
12 5 Williston, Contracts (Rev. Ed. 1937), § 1346; Crichfield v. Julia (1906),
203 U. S. 593, 27 S. Ct. 781, 147 Fed. 65; Emerson v. Pacific Coast & N. Packing
Co. (1905), 96 Minn. 1, 104 N. W. 573, 1 L. R. A. (N. S.) 445; Dart v.
Laimbeer (1887), 107 N. Y. 664, 14 N. E. 291.
13 2 Sedgwick, Damages (9th ed. 1920), § 622c; where the terms of the
contract to be entered into are not definitely fixed, Olympia Bottling Works v.
Olympia Brewing Co. (1910), 56 Ore. 87, 107 Pac. 969.
14 Slade v. Lexington (1910), 141 Ky. 214, 132 S. W. 404, 32 L. R. A. (N.
S.) 201; Faucett v. Northern Clay Co. (1915), 84 Wash. 382, 146 Pac. 857.
15 Harter v. Morris (1920), 72 Ind. App. 189, 123 N. E. 23; Stanton v.
Singleton (1899), 126 Cal. 657, 59 Pac. 146, 47 L. R. A. 334; Grayson L. Co. v.
Young (1915), 118 Va. 122, 86 S. E. 826; Restatement, Contracts (1934), § 370,
Comment b.
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tain their amount.1 6 The contract in the principal case is like these, both
in the matter of certainty and consideration. Consideration for the promise
of permanent employment may be found in the teacher's promise to give up
the privilege of teaching elsewhere during the required probationary period.
Minimum salaries are fixed by statute for the payment of teachers.17
Thus it appears that in any action at law for the breach of a teacher's tenure
contract, the teacher should be entitled to damages based on the minimum
salary established by law, or on the reasonable salary to which he was
entitled, if he can prove that the reasonable salary would have been higher
than the minimum established by law. C. D. S.
DAMAGES-BENEFITS RECEIVED FROM THIRD PARTIES IN MrriGATIoN.-Action
for personal injuries. Plaintiff appealed from the lower court's refusal to
instruct the jury that the fair value of the nursing care rendered plaintiff by
his wife was a proper element of damages. Held, affirmed. Daniels v. Celeste
(Mass. 1939), 21 N. E. (2d) 1.
It was reasoned that the fair value of nursing care is recoverable only if
the plaintiff has paid or incurred a legal liability to pay.1 The court pointed
out that, by reason of the marital relation, the plaintiff could not make a
valid contract with his wife for such services. 2 Therefore, thg plaintiff may
not recover for services for which he is under no obligation to pay.
The case adopts a minority rule that benefits received from sources wholly
independent of the wrongdoer may operate to reduce damages recoverable from
the latter.3 The court pointed out that the object of compensatory damages
is to afford the equivalent in money for the actual loss caused by the wrong
of another. 4 The conflict in cases has arisen in determining whether actual
loss has occurred. The principal case holds that no loss is suffered where the
plaintiff is under no obligation to pay for the services rendered. The issue
was early raised in cases involving a wrongdoer claiming benefit of insur-
16 Pennsylvania Co. v. Dolan (1892), 6 Ind. App. 109, 32 N. E. 802; Carnig
v. Carr (1897), 167 Mass. 544, 46 N. E. 117; Fisher v. John L Roper Lumber
Co. (1922), 183 N. C. 485, 111 S. E. 857; F. S. Royster Guano Co v. Hall
(1934), 68 Fed. (2d) 533.
17 Burns Ind. Stat. Ann. (1933), § 28-4314.
1 Hunt v. Boston Terminal Co. (1912), 212 Mass. 99, 98 N. E. 786.
2 Mass. G. L. (Ter. Ed.), c. 209, sec. 2: "A married woman may make
contracts, oral and written, sealed and unsealed, in the same manner as if
she were sole, except that she shall not be authorized hereby to make contracts
with her husband." This statute, although noted by the court, does not
change the common law since there can be no valid contract between husband
and wife for the performance of duties incident to the marriage relation.
Bohanan v. Maxwell (1921), 190 Iowa 1308, 181 N. W. 683.
3 McCormick on Damages (1935), sec. 90.
4 " 'Rule of damages is a practical instrumentality for the administration of
justice. The principle on which it is founded is compensation. Its object is
to afford the equivalent in money for the actual loss caused by the wrong of
another. Recurrence to this fundamental conception tests the soundness of
claims for the inclusion of new elements of damage.' Sullivan v. Old Colony
St. R. (1908), 197 Mass. 512, 83 N. W. 1091."
